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22 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman/Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council Advisor, and Director of Central Intelligence  
20 June 1977

1. Dr. Brzezinski's views are that we need to set up some mechanism for establishing and reviewing intelligence priorities. He further believes that we do not today have a credible clandestine collection or covert action capability in this country. We need that in order to better judge how other governments are making their decisions, how they look upon us and our policies, etc. We are not nearly as good at this kind of thing and overall political appraisals as we are at technical and hardware intelligence.
2. Cy Vance believes we need an advisory group or an executive committee that would meet at least quarterly. He, too, believes that our weakest area in both collection and analysis is in political motivation and intent.
3. Harold Brown pointed out that one reason for this deficiency is that intent is very difficult to discern. He emphasized that while we want input from the top on intelligence priorities, it should not all be a top-down problem, but an upward influence also. It would be too easy for the high-level decision-makers to forget the necessary bread and butter items. There is also danger that they would not recognize areas of longer term concern or emerging importance.
4. We need to decide whether the SCC will be the mechanism - advisory groups or executive committee - or whether in the reorganization something new will evolve.
5. Vance also pointed out our economic deficiencies and how much more important they are becoming. He also was concerned with the problem of overcollection and how we pare that down.
6. Harold Brown suggested we charge \$100 for every report we provide in order to prevent undue demands on the system.

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7. I believe we need a system such that any priority put in at the top automatically displaces others below it, rather than superimposing KIQs on a numerical and structured priority system without any guidance to the collectors and analyzers as to where the KIQ fits in. Brzezinski was moving into constructing a new system which would, in fact, be very similar to the KIQ/NSCID 1-2. This raises the issue of whether the NSCID 1-2 system is flexible enough to adapt the numerical priorities of lower priorities when a higher one is put in at the top in midstream?

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